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Laos Loosens Up 
Lao party pragmatists appear to be consolidating recent gains in promoting a mixed 
state and private economy, opening up trade and encouraging foreign investment. 
Economic changes have spurred the growth of small businesses throughout the 
country. In Vientiane, the appearance of restaurants and even discos reflects a more 
relaxed social atmosphere. 
Faith Keenan 
An end to the Lao-Thai border conflict in February 
1988 has brought an upswing in border trade and general 
cooperation between these two culturally and linguistically 
linked countries. Evidence of the free flow of goods can be 
seen everywhere. Bottles of American made ketchup and 
mustard dot restaurant tables with the usual hot sauce and 
fish sauce processed in Thailand. Local markets abound 
with clothing and household goods from across the 
border. 
The appearance of these everyday products reflects a 
general easing of social and economic strictures that 
began nearly a decade ago. Laos has come a long way 
since 1975 when the communist Pathet Lao (now the Lao 
People's Revolutionary Party) came to power and set 
Laos on the road to socialism. 
Since 1975, debate within the Lao People's Revolu-
tionary Party (LPRP) has centered on the process and 
pace of socialist transformation. Those favoring a gradual 
transition have endorsed a mixed state/private economy 
while hardliners viewed this position as ideological back-
sliding and have favored a more rapid transition. For the 
time being, the pragmatists have prevailed, but not 
without enduring the consequences of counterproductive 
policies backed by party stalwarts. 
Colonial Neglect 
the landlocked country before it became independent in 
1953. Their plans to construct a railway linking Laos to 
the coast of Vietnam never materialized. Instead of 
training Lao functionaries, the French employed Viet-
namese to run the middle level of its colonial government. 
The French paid little attention to industrial development; 
Laos became a hinterland of the French Indochina 
empire, exploited for the raw materials it could supply to 
the more advanced Vietnam possession and to France 
itself. 
Development during the subsequent 20 years was held 
hostage to the struggle for control of the country between 
the Pathet Lao, the neutralists under Prince Souvanna 
Phouma, and the U.S.-backed rightists. U.S. bombing 
campaigns in the late 1960s and early 1970s targeted 
Vietnamese supply lines that ran through Laos, disrupting 
the fragile rural economy and displacing hundreds of 
thousands of peasants. Throughout this period, the 
country could not provide food for its population and 
relied on outside aid for survival. 
The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) in-
herited an economy based on subsistence agriculture. 
French colonial administrators had done little to develop 
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After broad reforms were announced in December 1979, profit became the primary 
measure of performance for state enterprises. 
When the Pathet Lao eventually gained control of the 
country in 1975, the family farm or plot rented from a 
landlord remained the main economic unit. Ninety 
percent of the labor force worked in subsistence agricul-
ture, a figure that remains the same today. 
The communist leaders faced the same economic 
difficulties as their colonial predecessors. Laos had no 
easy access to the sea, an inadequate transportation and 
communication infrastructure precluded centralized con-
trol, and its population consisted of many ethnic groups 
which did not welcome attempts to regulate their lives. 




Resulting shortages and rapidly rising prices prompted 
the new regime to quickly impose state controls. It 
nationalized industry and banking in the first year, but 
could neither stem inflation nor meet needs for food, fuel, 
spare parts or raw materials. The government then 
confiscated property of merchants and abolished private 
commerce, replacing it with state trading. Goods were 
channelled through state-run stores and marketing coop-
eratives. When the regime implemented an in-kind rice 
tax to stock state stores, it met with fierce opposition in 
the countryside and responded by severely curtailing 
personal liberties. Individuals had to request permission 
to travel between villages. The government also dis-
couraged religious practices and required that people 
attend political seminars. 
Meanwhile, a program of the International Monetary 
Fund's Foreign Exchange Operations Fund that sup-
ported the Lao kip collapsed with the end of American 
aid, causing inflation to skyrocket. The deteriorating 
economy and tight social controls during the mid 1970s 
led nearly 40,000 Lao to leave the country. This exodus, 
which included many professionals and technically trained 
workers, deprived Laos of the know-how to turn around 
the economy. The country still has not recovered from the 
loss. 
Government policies in 1976 exacerbated inflation as 
the state pumped funds into new state-run shops, in-
dustries, marketing cooperatives and trading companies. 
Wages increased 400 percent per year to keep pace with 
prices and the state simply printed more money to cover 
the widening budget deficit, further fueling inflation. 
Drought cut the 1976 rice harvest, forcing importation of 
the staple to meet the population's needs, and thus 
increasing the trade deficit. 
In 1978, the regime launched an interim three-year plan 
in an attempt to make Laos self-sufficient in food. 
Agricultural collectivization was expected to increase 
production as well as forge a new socialist spirit. 
The strategy had the opposite effect. Since land reform 
did not precede collectivization, farmers with larger tracts 
of land opposed the plan to pool land and equipment. 
Taxes based on rice production proved a disincentive to 
farmers and production dropped. An additional 50,000 
Lao from lowland regions left the country in 1978. 
Economic pragmatists scored a victory in mid-1979 
when the regime abandoned the collectivization program. 
The decision formed part of a broader reconsideration of 
economic policy then underway in Vientiane, the capital. 
The regime announced broad reforms in December 
1979, acknowledging that capitalist as well as socialist 
economic laws had to be considered to promote develop-
ment. New policies loosened restrictions on private 
participation in manufacturing, commerce, and trans-
portation and encouraged individuals to develop small 
businesses. Profit became the primary measure of per-
formance for state enterprises. Agricultural taxation 
shifted from a system based on output to one based on 
average land fertility, allowing farmers to sell excess 
paddy on the open market and providing incentives for 
increasing yields and planting a second crop. Within a few 
months, production of rice, livestock and forestry in-
creased, and market activity picked up. 
The 1979 plan acknowledges that the Lao economy 
consists of five overlapping sectors: state, collective, 
individual, urban capitalist and mixed state and private. 
The state sector includes large farms, banking institutions 
as well as state construction and transport industries. The 
collective sector comprises cooperative farms which con-
trol about 20 percent of the crop land. The individual 
economy includes self-employed farmers, handicraft pro-
ducers and small traders. The urban capitalist economy 
consists of industrial, trading, and transport companies 
owned by private entrepreneurs. The mixed state and 
private sector brings the government together with private 
investors in joint ventures. This framework remains 
today. Premier Kaysone Phomvihan cited the continued 
need for the coexistence of these five sectors in a 1986 
speech: 
"In our country there are still nearly all the modes of 
production, from primitive to contemporary modes 
of production. . . . All these sectors exert an inter-
effect on one another, depend on one another and 
remain united in an economy still in the period of 
transition to socialism." 
The foreign investment law encourages ventures in agriculture, forestry, industry, 
transport, services and tourism. More than 100 foreign companies already have explored 
investment possibilities in Laos. 
Five-Year Plans 
( 1 9 8 1 - 8 5 , 1 9 8 8 - 9 0 ) 
The first five-year plan (1981-85) put forth by the 
LPRP aimed to promote agricultural production, build 
strategically important enterprises, train economic man-
agers and technicians, complete the literacy campaign, 
restructure state management organizations, and acquire 
and efficiently use foreign economic assistance. None of 
the targets for the initial plan were met, due variously to 
the loss of skilled workers and consequent lack of 
economic and technical expertise, the disruptive effects of 
resistance activities, and problems of centralized control. 
Laos' close ties to Vietnam cut off avenues of foreign aid 
and the LPDR began to base resource allocations on 
defense and diplomatic considerations rather than on 
sound economic policy. 
Unmet expectations continued to fuel the debate 
between pragmatists and ideologues as the Fourth Party 
Congress launched its second five-year plan (1986-90). 
Kaysone criticized the hardliners, saying "our main 
shortcomings lie in subjectivism and haste, in our inclina-
tion to abolish the non-socialist economic sectors 
promptly." 
The aims echoed those of the first plan, with an 
emphasis on improving management and efficiency in 
state enterprises and on encouraging the establishment of 
small private enterprises through a three-year tax exemp-
tion. After agriculture, forestry became the government's 
second priority, reflecting the importance of timber as an 
export commodity. 
Kaysone continues to promote gradualism. Pravda, the 
Soviet daily, recently quoted him as saying: 
"Experience told us that we could not act in haste to 
advance directly to socialism through elimination of 
the old economic foundation because the private 
and individual economies and markets are feeding 
the people throughout the nation. Since then, we 
have modified the attitude of Left-leaning and haste 
and stopped abolishing private and individual rights 
to ownership and markets." 
Garnering Foreign Exchange 
At present, Laos' budget and trade deficits continue to 
increase annually. In 1987, total imports were three times 
the country's exports, according to IMF statistics. These 
figures do not, however, give an accurate picture of Laos' 
trade balance since they exclude trade with the socialist 
bloc and the substantial sale of Lao electricity to Thailand. 
Nevertheless, revenues barely meet expenditures on sal-
aries, subsidies, debt servicing, materials and supplies. 
Development thus depends on foreign aid and investment. 
Realizing this, and recognizing that a lack of consti-
tutional protection against expropriation may discourage 
investors, the government issued a foreign investment 
code in June 1988 to lay the groundwork for joint 
ventures. The law allows foreign companies to establish 
joint ventures with a minimum of 30 percent foreign 
capital, protects property against nationalization, and 
allows foreign companies to repatriate their profits after 
paying profit taxes ranging from 20 percent in the 
SOCIALIST INNOVATION 
A model of socialist resourcefulness, the Phone-
tong cooperative lies on the outskirts of Vientiane. 
Its beginnings in 1979 were humble: a few women 
would gather to weave on hand looms and share 
gossip. Within a decade, the cooperative had blos-
somed into a full-fledged production unit. Nearly 80 
women worked full-time, at both hand and auto-
mated looms, to produce traditional intricate weav-
ings as well as ordinary terry cloth for export. 
By August 1988 all that had changed. The cackle 
of shared family trivia had disappeared. The looms 
were left to gather dust in wooden sheds, used only 
occasionally by young women doing piece work. 
The cooperative, however, had not failed. Lib-
eralized government trade policies and better rela-
tions with Thailand had prompted Phonetong's 
director to transform the cooperative from a textile 
operation yielding low foreign exchange to the more 
lucrative lumber business. The recent ban on lum-
bering in Thailand had thrust Lao wood into a 
prime market position. Today, behind the quiet 
weaving shed, workers run electric saws through 
rough cedar logs while others load the processed 
lumber onto trucks. 
Observers have been particularly impressed by 
the speed with which the move from weaving to 
lumbering has taken place at Phonetong—an un-
usual phenomenon in the world of cumbersome 
socialist bureaucracies. One Lao specialist studying 
the cooperative noted that it has accomplished a 
total transformation in only six months. 
While the Lao market is not large, Thailand sees it as a springboard to the rest of 
Indochina once the Cambodian conflict is resolved. 
government's priority sectors to 35 percent in the trading 
and hotel sectors. 
The law encourages investment in agriculture, forestry, 
industry, transport, services and tourism. More than 100 
foreign companies have sent representatives to Laos to 
explore investment possibilities, the majority from Thai-
land where Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan is 
encouraging economic cooperation with its Indochina 
neighbors. In 1978, the Lao government established the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade to 
promote Lao exports and attract foreign investment. 
Economic agreements already have been signed with 
Japan, France, Sweden, the World Bank and U.N. 
agencies. The government especially courts overseas Lao, 
encouraging them to return to take up their abandoned 
businesses or to invest in tourism and small industry. 
Lao-American Bouneome Rattanavong intends to 
take Vientiane up on its offer. Originally from 
Savannakhet in southern Laos, Rattanavong says he 
"comes from a very poor family." He left Laos in 1975 and 
since arriving in the United States has followed develop-
ments in Laos very closely. Now, Rattanavong says, "I'm 
trying to go back to Laos to make an investment there." 
"When Laos started changing its foreign investment 
policy, we submitted a [development] proposal", he says. 
When the Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited him to 
visit, he was at first wary of the offer. "I delayed two or 
three months before going," says Rattanavong. "I wasn't 
sure if it was just propaganda or if there was serious 
interest. But I decided to follow through." 
He first returned to Vientiane in March 1988, and made 
subsequent trips to work out details of his investment 
proposal in April and September. Through a joint venture 
with the Municipality of Vientiane, he plans to build a 
300-room world-class hotel in the capital and has sur-
veyed potential sites in the picturesque northern province 
of Luang Prabang and in Savannakhet as well. 
"The main goal is to bring more tourists to Laos," he 
says. Now, "there are many hotels in Vientiane, but they 
are not places you would like to sleep in." While the Lao 
bureaucracy tends to move slowly on most matters, 
having friends in the right places eased the way for 
Rattanavong. He admits he has an advantage by being 
Lao and knowing the "Lao way." Investors of other 
nationalities may find the unwieldy bureaucracy cumber-
some and the Lao clock trying. 
Rattanavong says that when he arrived in Vientiane last 
year, it seemed "the world had stopped in 1975... I saw 
only small changes. They were just beginning to lease to 
private enterprises." By his third trip, many more small 
shops, cafes, discos and restaurants had opened in the 
capital. "They have asked themselves, 'what are we 
fighting for, a system or a good life?'" he says. "They say 'a 
good life,' so they are willing to make changes." 
"It's too late to backtrack," Rattanavong says. "Every-
one knows socialism, communism, doesn't work They 
don't want to go backwards." 
Regional Trade 
Change is occurring slower in the manufacturing 
sector. The few factories that operate outside Vientiane 
produce only light consumer items like cigarettes, beer, 
soda, finished wood, and brick. Since most factories date 
to the early 1970s, machinery and equipment are outdated. 
Trade, however, has boomed as a result of the changes. 
Since 1975, quantities of Thai goods have regularly been 
smuggled into Laos. But a recent easing of tensions has led 
to increasingly open private trade between the two 
neighbors. Thailand supplies such a wide variety of goods 
to the Lao market that Lao consumers accept Thai 
currency as readily as their own. 
Chatichai pledged to turn Indochina "from a battlefield 
into a trading market" shortly after he took office in 
August 1988, and relations between Laos and Thailand 
warmed considerably when Chatichai visited Vientiane 
several months later. Thailand also has reduced from 61 
to 29 the number of "strategic" items banned for export to 
Laos. 
Laos seems the natural place for Thais to begin 
developing economic links with Indochina. Thailand has 
officially maintains an economic embargo of Vietnam 
and Cambodia since Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia in 
1978. Chatichai's predecessor, Prem Tinsulanond, had 
put the isolation of communist Indochina ahead of 
prospects for Thailand's economic expansion in the 
region. While the Lao market is not large, Thailand sees it 
as a springboard to the rest of Indochina once the 
Cambodian conflict is resolved. 
Laos is also a potential source of raw materials for 
Thailand. It exported more than US$25 million worth of 
hydroelectric power, minerals, and timber to the Thais in 
1987. In the same year, total trade between the two 
approached US$50 million, with trade between the two 
countries increasing markedly in the last year. According 
to Bank of Thailand figures, Lao exports to Thailand 
during the first six months of 1988, not including 
electricity, increased 350 percent over the same period in 
1987. Thailand's exports to Laos increased by nearly 50 
percent for the same period. Sources estimate that 
smuggling roughly equals official trade, indicating a 
healthy potential for expansion. 
Talks in Vientiane in January sought to promote 
For the moment, Laos seems to have abandoned a basic principle of economic 
development—foregoing consumption to save and invest—and many fear that spending 
on luxury items is creating an artificial economy incapable of sustaining itself. 
greater economic cooperation. Laos requested that Thai-
land lower prices for shipping goods across Thailand, 
reduce the duty on Lao exports, drop the "strategic 
goods" category banned from export to Laos, and 
increase the number of trading points from two to five. 
The Thais requested that a Thai bank be allowed to open 
a branch in Vientiane to serve Thai businessmen and that 
Laos lift its ban on exporting unprocessed timber. The 
Lao government had issued the ban in December 1988, 
hoping that the measure would boost exports of processed 
wood, but foreign buyers complain about both price and 
quality of Lao processed wood. 
Laos has successfully attracted other major investors. 
Japanese businessmen have contracted to build roads and 
set up a pharmaceutical factory, while investors from 
France, Australia, and South Korea have also been 
scouting out potential projects. Last December, Laos and 
China signed their first bilateral trade agreement in over a 
decade. China plans to export consumer goods, textiles 
and small agricultural equipment to Laos, while Laos will 
send timber, agricultural products and herbal medicines 
to China. Laos expects trade between the two countries to 
total more than US$10 million in 1989. 
Development of trade with the United States has not 
been so smooth. Prompted by the State Department's 
annual drug certification report, the Bush Administration 
recently censured Laos for it lack of cooperation with the 
United States in its crackdown on drug trafficking. The 
censure severely restricts direct bilateral assistance to Laos 
and has made U.S. banks hesitant to approve loans for 
financial ventures. Rattanavong noted that while a loan 
he has requested has not been denied, it is taking longer 
than he expected to get an approval. "The banks are more 
cautious about funding," he says. "But it hasn't dis-
couraged me from doing business with Laos." 
Many observers regard the censure as a step backward 
for Lao-U.S. relations, which formally remain at the 
charge d'affaires level. Upon release of the State Depart-
ment report, Laos refused to receive a U.S. delegation 
searching for Americans designated as missing in action 
(MIA) in Laos. While the delegation eventually did visit 
Vientiane, the episode created hard feelings and misgiv-
ings on both sides. 
Social Side Effects 
A relaxed social atmosphere has gone hand-in-hand 
with liberalized economic controls in Vientiane over the 
last two years. The Ministry of Tourism has even opened a 
new disco, the Vieng Latimay, or the "New Vientiane at 
Nighttime Club," to lure tourists and businessmen as well 
as capital. This official endorsement of rock *n roll is ironic 
since communist regimes have typically condemned such 
music as a corrupting capitalist, bourgeois influence. Lao 
officials previously denounced rock as "poison" for the 
people, saying it "promoted extravagance, wasting of 
time, and loss of interest in production." 
"Things have definitely loosened up,"says one Western 
official in Vientiane. "When I arrived two years ago, 
things closed at 6 p.m." Now the garish Vieng Latimay 
and other discos rock until midnight. 
Both Lao and Western officials openly wonder whether 
such relaxed social attitudes will endure in a society 
traditionally shrouded by secrecy and suspicion. Some 
fear that if prostitution, drunkenness, and conspicuous 
consumption increase, Lao officials may revert to former 
policies that limited private enterprise and banned Lao 
contact with Westerners. 
Some concern has already been voiced that Lao spend 
much-needed foreign exchange on consumer goods rather 
than investing in long-term development efforts. For the 
moment, Laos seems to have abandoned a basic principle 
of economic development—foregoing consumption to 
save and invest—and many fear that spending on luxury 
items is creating an artificial economy incapable of 
sustaining itself 
For the time being, a wait-and-see attitude prevails in 
the capital as crowds of young Lao jam Vieng Latimay 
nightly to drink Foster's Lager and gyrate to a Lao band's 
respectable renditions of Beatles'and Rolling Stones'hits. 
The club, which opened last July, grossed receipts far 
beyond anyone's expectations. The first month's take 
reportedly totalled US$21,000. This surprising figure has 
aroused the curiosity of western officials who question its 
source. UNICEF program officer Walter Sitzmann called 
it "an amazing sum" for a country with an estimated per 
capita income of US$135. Many suspect that openness 
has spurred the flow of "mattress money," cash or capital 
hoarded since 1975 in anticipation of better times. 
Remittances from relatives abroad may also be ending up 
in Vieng Latimay coffers. 
No one knows if either disco euphoria or economic 
liberalism will last. Lao officials seem willing to tolerate 
that which they once considered distasteful, Sitzmann 
says, because they feel changes will draw investment for 
economic development. Others fear that changes have 
been introduced too quickly and that ensuing corruption 
may cause the government to crack down on raucous 
nightlife and economic liberalism. 
Rattanavong maintains his optimism. "I feel they are 
serious about development," he says. "They did what they 
said they would do, and they are even welcoming refugees 
back." 
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